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Basket Mint - Security Review Summary

Independent smart-contract code review + remediation re-audit. Scope: the Solidity contracts in src/ (~1,600 LOC), tests, config and deploy scripts.

All findings
remediated 1 High · 2 Med · 1 Low
0 Critical 40 / 40
Foundry tests passing

An independent reviewer examined the contracts, ran the Foundry suite, and reported findings; a follow-up re-audit confirmed every finding was resolved in the updated code, with new regression tests added. Full reports: initial review ↗ · re-audit ↗.

Findings & status

#	Severity	Status	Finding
H-01	High	Resolved	Collateral oracle accepted stale prices indefinitely (no heartbeat). Now validates heartbeat, positive/complete/non-future answer, and staleness; factory rejects a feed configured without a heartbeat.
M-01	Medium	Resolved	Fee & liquidation conversions ignored the configured collateral price (assumed $1). A shared `_usdToCollateral()` helper now inverts the valuation with upward rounding across mint/stability fees, seizure, and principal.
M-02	Medium	Resolved	Rewards could be lost when the last staker exited (zero-staker window). Last-staker withdrawal checkpoints earned rewards, freezes the stream, and records/recovers the unvested amount.
L-01	Low	Resolved	Overnight market-hours weekday boundary. Morning portion checks the previous day; evening portion checks the current day.

Re-audit verification

The updated source compiled with solc 0.8.24 and the full Foundry suite passed - 40 passed, 0 failed across five suites, including two stateful solvency invariants (64 runs and 2,048 calls each) and new regression coverage for stale/future collateral data, non-$1 fee scaling, last-staker reward handling, and overnight boundaries.

Residual deployment assumptions

The configured collateral must be a standard, non-fee-on-transfer ERC-20 (the market accounts for the requested transfer amount).
Oracle feed selection, heartbeat sizing, owner/guardian control, insurance funding, and governance recovery authority remain deliberate operational trust assumptions.
This review validates the remediation diff and the supplied tests; it is not a formal assurance or launch approval, and this is still a testnet preview.

A broader internal security review (AUDIT.md) was also performed during development, covering additional hardening (oracle-outage tolerance, XSS escaping, timelock/multisig governance tooling, an insurance backstop, and a fuzz + invariant campaign).

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